

# Twitter Revolutions

## *Classroom Assessments*



by Andrew Conneen and William Tinkler

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## Assessments: “This is Just the Start”

*Thomas Friedman*

- a. Describe 3 of the factors that Friedman attributes to the mass revolt in Egypt.
- b. Explain how Friedman’s factors connect the concepts of *globalization* and *democratization*.
- c. Explain how Friedman redefines the social network and its influence on the “Arab Spring” movements?

# Column: This is Just the Start

*March 1, 2011*

*The New York Times*

*By Thomas Friedman*

Future historians will long puzzle over how the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in protest over the confiscation of his fruit stand, managed to trigger popular uprisings across the Arab/Muslim world. We know the big causes — tyranny, rising food prices, youth unemployment and social media. But since being in Egypt, I've been putting together my own back-of-the-envelope guess list of what I'd call the "not-so-obvious forces" that fed this mass revolt. Here it is:

**THE OBAMA FACTOR** Americans have never fully appreciated what a radical thing we did — in the eyes of the rest of the world — in electing an African-American with the middle name Hussein as president. I'm convinced that listening to Obama's 2009 Cairo speech — not the words, but the man — were more than a few young Arabs who were saying to themselves: "Hmmm, let's see. He's young. I'm young. He's dark-skinned. I'm dark-skinned. His middle name is Hussein. My name is Hussein. His grandfather is a Muslim. My grandfather is a Muslim. He is president of the United States. And I'm an unemployed young Arab with no vote and no voice in my future." I'd put that in my mix of forces fueling these revolts.

**GOOGLE EARTH** While Facebook has gotten all the face time in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain, don't forget Google Earth, which began roiling Bahraini politics in 2006. A big issue in Bahrain, particularly among Shiite men who want to get married and build homes, is the unequal distribution of land. On Nov. 27, 2006, on the eve of parliamentary elections in Bahrain, The Washington Post ran this report from there: "Mahmood, who lives in a house with his parents, four siblings and their children, said he became even more frustrated when he looked up Bahrain

on Google Earth and saw vast tracts of empty land, while tens of thousands of mainly poor Shiites were squashed together in small, dense areas. ‘We are 17 people crowded in one small house, like many people in the southern district,’ he said. ‘And you see on Google how many palaces there are and how the al-Khalifas [the Sunni ruling family] have the rest of the country to themselves.’ Bahraini activists have encouraged people to take a look at the country on Google Earth, and they have set up a special user group whose members have access to more than 40 images of royal palaces.”

**ISRAEL** The Arab TV network Al Jazeera has a big team covering Israel today. Here are some of the stories they have been beaming into the Arab world: Israel’s previous prime minister, Ehud Olmert, had to resign because he was accused of illicitly taking envelopes stuffed with money from a Jewish-American backer. An Israeli court recently convicted Israel’s former president Moshe Katsav on two counts of rape, based on accusations by former employees. And just a few weeks ago, Israel, at the last second, rescinded the appointment of Maj. Gen. Yoav Galant as the army’s new chief of staff after Israeli environmentalists spurred a government investigation that concluded General Galant had seized public land near his home. (You can see his house on Google Maps!) This surely got a few laughs in Egypt where land sales to fat cats and cronies of the regime that have resulted in huge overnight profits have been the talk of Cairo this past year. When you live right next to a country that is bringing to justice its top leaders for corruption and you live in a country where many of the top leaders are corrupt, well, you notice.

**THE BEIJING OLYMPICS** China and Egypt were both great civilizations subjected to imperialism and were both dirt poor back in the 1950s, with China even poorer than Egypt, Edward Goldberg, who teaches business strategy, wrote in *The Globalist*. But, today, China has built the world’s second-largest economy, and Egypt is still living on foreign aid. What do you think young Egyptians thought when they watched the dazzling opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics? China’s Olympics were another wake-up call — “in a way that America or the West could never be” — telling young Egyptians that something was very wrong with their country, argued Goldberg.

**THE FAYYAD FACTOR** Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad introduced a new form of government in the Arab world in the last three years, something I’ve dubbed “Fayyadism.” It

said: judge me on my performance, on how I deliver government services and collect the garbage and create jobs — not simply on how I “resist” the West or Israel. Every Arab could relate to this. Chinese had to give up freedom but got economic growth and decent government in return. Arabs had to give up freedom and got the Arab-Israeli conflict and unemployment in return.

Add it all up and what does it say? It says you have a very powerful convergence of forces driving a broad movement for change. It says we’re just at the start of something huge. And it says that if we don’t have a more serious energy policy, the difference between a good day and bad day for America from here on will hinge on how the 86-year-old king of Saudi Arabia manages all this change.

## Cartoon Assessment 1

Directions: a. Identify the object that the person is shooting from the slingshot in this cartoon.

b. Explain the message that the artist is trying to communicate in this cartoon.



## Cartoon Assessment 2

Directions: a. Explain the cartoonist's perspective about the contrast between democratization in Egypt and Iran.


b. Describe two methods used by the Iranian government that fit the artist's depiction of Iran's response to the 2011 democratization movement in the Middle East.



## Cartoon Assessment 3

Directions: a. Explain the cartoonist's perspective about the role of social networking in the Arab Spring of 2011 as contrasted with the Syrian response to democratization efforts.


b. Describe two methods used by authoritarian governments looking to minimize the impact of social networking on democratization movements.



## Cartoon Assessment 4

Directions: a. Explain the cartoonist's perspective about the difference between deposing an authoritarian leader as contrasted with establishing a true democracy.

b. Describe two changes that former authoritarian governments can make to establish a true democracy.



# Assessments: *From Dictatorship to Democracy*

## *Weakness of Dictatorships*

- a. Use historical examples to describe how three of Gene Sharp's "Weakness of Dictatorships" have been evident in any of the AP Comparative Government and Politics core countries.
- b. Use contemporary examples to describe how three of Gene Sharp's "Weakness of Dictatorships" have been evident in any of the AP Comparative Government and Politics core countries.
- c. Describe three acts of political defiance that have been used to try to weaken authoritarian rule in an AP Comparative Government and Politics core country.
- d. Explain how each of these acts of political defiance could contribute to democratization in that AP Comparative Government and Politics core country.

## *Political Defiance*

- a. Brainstorm 10 examples of political defiance. Identify how many of these appear on Sharp's list of "Methods of nonviolent action."
- b. Categorize your list of 10 acts of political defiance according to Sharp's 4 categories of: protest, persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention.
- c. Explain which of these acts of political defiance you think would be most effective at weakening an example of authoritarian rule in an AP Comparative Government and Politics core country.

## *Arab Spring (update 2012)*

- a. Find an article that analyzes a country in which widespread political violence was used to try to weaken authoritarian rule during the "Arab Spring—2011."
- b. Find an article that analyzes a country in which nonviolent political defiance was the primary method used to try to weaken authoritarian rule during the "Arab Spring—2011."
- c. Compare and contrast efforts to weaken authoritarian rule in the two countries that each article addresses.
- d. Compare and contrast democratization efforts in the two countries that each article addresses.
- e. Explain how your findings might compare or contrast with Gene Sharp's thesis about the role of political defiance in weakening authoritarian rule.

Excerpts from FDTD:

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FROM  
DICTATORSHIP  
TO  
DEMOCRACY

*A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*

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Fourth U.S. Edition

Gene Sharp

The Albert Einstein Institution

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## *Ch. 4--Dictatorships Have Weaknesses*

Dictatorships often appear invulnerable. Intelligence agencies, police, military forces, prisons, concentration camps, and execution squads are controlled by a powerful few. A country's finances, natural resources, and production capacities are often arbitrarily plundered by dictators and used to support the dictators' will.

In comparison, democratic opposition forces often appear extremely weak, ineffective, and powerless. That perception of invulnerability against powerlessness makes effective opposition unlikely.

That is not the whole story, however.

### **Identifying the Achilles' heel**

A myth from Classical Greece illustrates well the vulnerability of the supposedly invulnerable. Against the warrior Achilles, no blow would injure and no sword would penetrate his skin. When still a baby, Achilles' mother had supposedly dipped him into the waters of the magical river Styx, resulting in the protection of his body from all dangers. There was, however, a problem. Since the baby was held by his heel so that he would not be washed away, the magical water had not covered that small part of his body. When Achilles was a grown man he appeared to all to be invulnerable to the enemies' weapons. However, in the battle against Troy, instructed by one who knew the weakness, an enemy soldier aimed his arrow at Achilles' unprotected heel, the one spot where he could be injured. The strike proved fatal. Still today, the phrase "Achilles' heel" refers to the vulnerable part of a person, a plan, or an institution at which if attacked there is no protection.

The same principle applies to ruthless dictatorships. They, too, can be conquered, but most quickly and with least cost if their weaknesses can be identified and the attack concentrated on them.

### **Weaknesses of dictatorships**

Among the weaknesses of dictatorships are the following:

1. The cooperation of a multitude of people, groups, and institutions needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn.
2. The requirements and effects of the regime's past policies will somewhat limit its present ability to adopt and implement conflicting policies.
3. The system may become routine in its operation, less able to adjust quickly to new situations.
4. Personnel and resources already allocated for existing tasks will not be easily available for new needs.

5. Subordinates fearful of displeasing their superiors may not report accurate or complete information needed by the dictators to make decisions.
6. The ideology may erode, and myths and symbols of the system may become unstable.
7. If a strong ideology is present that influences one's view of reality, firm adherence to it may cause inattention to actual conditions and needs.
8. Deteriorating efficiency and competency of the bureaucracy, or excessive controls and regulations, may make the system's policies and operation ineffective.
9. Internal institutional conflicts and personal rivalries and hostilities may harm, and even disrupt, the operation of the dictatorship.
10. Intellectuals and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions, doctrinalism, and repression.
11. The general public may over time become apathetic, skeptical, and even hostile to the regime.
12. Regional, class, cultural, or national differences may become acute.
13. The power hierarchy of the dictatorship is always unstable to some degree, and at times extremely so. Individuals do not only remain in the same position in the ranking, but may rise or fall to other ranks or be removed entirely and replaced by new persons.
14. Sections of the police or military forces may act to achieve their own objectives, even against the will of established dictators, including by coup d'état.
15. If the dictatorship is new, time is required for it to become well established.
16. With so many decisions made by so few people in the dictatorship, mistakes of judgment, policy, and action are likely to occur.
17. If the regime seeks to avoid these dangers and decentralizes controls and decision making, its control over the central levers of power may be further eroded.

### **Attacking weaknesses of dictatorships**

With knowledge of such inherent weaknesses, the democratic opposition can seek to aggravate these "Achilles' heels" deliberately in order to alter the system drastically or to disintegrate it.

The conclusion is then clear: despite the appearances of strength, all dictatorships have weaknesses, internal inefficiencies, personal rivalries, institutional inefficiencies, and conflicts between organizations and departments. These weaknesses, over time, tend to make the regime less effective and more vulnerable to changing conditions and deliberate resistance. Not everything the regime sets out to accomplish will get completed. At times, for example, even Hitler's direct orders were never implemented because those beneath him in the hierarchy refused to carry them out. The dictatorial regime may at times even fall apart quickly, as we have already observed.

This does not mean dictatorships can be destroyed without risks and casualties. Every possible course of action for liberation will involve risks and potential suffering, and will take time

to operate. And, of course, no means of action can ensure rapid success in every situation. However, types of struggle that target the dictatorship's identifiable weaknesses have greater chance of success than those that seek to fight the dictatorship where it is clearly strongest. The question is *how* this struggle is to be waged.

## *Ch. 5--Exercising Power*

In Chapter One we noted that military resistance against dictatorships does not strike them where they are weakest, but rather where they are strongest. By choosing to compete in the areas of military forces, supplies of ammunition, weapons technology, and the like, resistance movements tend to put themselves at a distinct disadvantage. Dictatorships will almost always be able to muster superior resources in these areas. The dangers of relying on foreign powers for salvation were also outlined. In Chapter Two we examined the problems of relying on negotiations as a means to remove dictatorships.

What means are then available that will offer the democratic resistance distinct advantages and will tend to aggravate the identified weaknesses of dictatorships? What technique of action will capitalize on the theory of political power discussed in Chapter Three? The alternative of choice is political defiance.

Political defiance has the following characteristics:

- It does not accept that the outcome will be decided by the means of fighting chosen by the dictatorship.
- It is difficult for the regime to combat.
- It can uniquely aggravate weaknesses of the dictatorship and can sever its sources of power.
- It can in action be widely dispersed but can also be concentrated on a specific objective.
- It leads to errors of judgment and action by the dictators.
- It can effectively utilize the population as a whole and the society's groups and institutions in the struggle to end the brutal domination of the few.
- It helps to spread the distribution of effective power in the society, making the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society more possible.

### **The workings of nonviolent struggle**

Like military capabilities, political defiance can be employed for a variety of purposes, ranging from efforts to influence the opponents to take different actions, to create conditions for a peaceful resolution of conflict, or to disintegrate the opponents' regime. However, political

defiance operates in quite different ways from violence. Although both techniques are means to wage struggle, they do so with very different means and with different consequences. The ways and results of violent conflict are well known. Physical weapons are used to intimidate, injure, kill, and destroy.

Nonviolent struggle is a much more complex and varied means of struggle than is violence. Instead, the struggle is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons applied by the population and the institutions of the society. These have been known under various names of protests, strikes, noncooperation, boycotts, disaffection, and people power. As noted earlier, all governments can rule only as long as they receive replenishment of the needed sources of their power from the cooperation, submission, and obedience of the population and the institutions of the society. Political defiance, unlike violence, is uniquely suited to severing those sources of power.

### **Nonviolent weapons and discipline**

The common error of past improvised political defiance campaigns is the reliance on only one or two methods, such as strikes and mass demonstrations. In fact, a multitude of methods exist that allow resistance strategists to concentrate and disperse resistance as required.

About two hundred specific methods of nonviolent action have been identified, and there are certainly scores more. These methods are classified under three broad categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are largely symbolic demonstrations, including parades, marches, and vigils (54 methods). Noncooperation is divided into three sub-categories: (a) social noncooperation (16 methods), (b) economic noncooperation, including boycotts (26 methods) and strikes (23 methods), and (c) political noncooperation (38 methods). Nonviolent intervention, by psychological, physical, social, economic, or political means, such as the fast, nonviolent occupation, and parallel government (41 methods), is the final group. A list of 198 of these methods is included as the Appendix to this publication.

The use of a considerable number of these methods — carefully chosen, applied persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate tactics, by trained civilians— is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems. This applies to all dictatorships.

In contrast to military means, the methods of nonviolent struggle can be focused directly on the issues at stake. For example, since the issue of dictatorship is primarily political, then political forms of nonviolent struggle would be crucial. These would include denial of legitimacy

to the dictators and noncooperation with their regime. Noncooperation would also be applied against specific policies. At times stalling and procrastination may be quietly and even secretly practiced, while at other times open disobedience and defiant public demonstrations and strikes may be visible to all.

On the other hand, if the dictatorship is vulnerable to economic pressures or if many of the popular grievances against it are economic, then economic action, such as boycotts or strikes, may be appropriate resistance methods. The dictators' efforts to exploit the economic system might be met with limited general strikes, slowdowns, and refusal of assistance by (or disappearance of) indispensable experts. Selective use of various types of strikes may be conducted at key points in manufacturing, in transport, in the supply of raw materials, and in the distribution of products.

Some methods of nonviolent struggle require people to perform acts unrelated to their normal lives, such as distributing leaflets, operating an underground press, going on hunger strike, or sitting down in the streets. These methods may be difficult for some people to undertake except in very extreme situations.

Other methods of nonviolent struggle instead require people to continue approximately their normal lives, though in somewhat different ways. For example, people may report for work, instead of striking, but then deliberately work more slowly or inefficiently than usual. "Mistakes" may be consciously made more frequently. One may become "sick" and "unable" to work at certain times. Or, one may simply refuse to work. One might go to religious services when the act expresses not only religious but also political convictions. One may act to protect children from the attackers' propaganda by education at home or in illegal classes. One might refuse to join certain "recommended" or required organizations that one would not have joined freely in earlier times. The similarity of such types of action to people's usual activities and the limited degree of departure from their normal lives may make participation in the national liberation struggle much easier for many people.

Since nonviolent struggle and violence operate in fundamentally different ways, even limited resistance violence during a political defiance campaign will be counterproductive, for it will shift the struggle to one in which the dictators have an overwhelming advantage (military warfare). Nonviolent discipline is a key to success and must be maintained despite provocations and brutalities by the dictators and their agents.

The maintenance of nonviolent discipline against violent opponents facilitates the workings of the four mechanisms of change in nonviolent struggle (discussed below). Nonviolent discipline is also extremely important in the process of political jiu-jitsu. In this process the stark brutality of the regime against the clearly nonviolent actionists politically rebounds against the

dictators' position, causing dissension in their own ranks as well as fomenting support for the resisters among the general population, the regime's usual supporters, and third parties.

In some cases, however, limited violence against the dictatorship may be inevitable. Frustration and hatred of the regime may explode into violence. Or, certain groups may be unwilling to abandon violent means even though they recognize the important role of nonviolent struggle. In these cases, political defiance does not need to be abandoned. However, it will be necessary to separate the violent action as far as possible from the nonviolent action. This should be done in terms of geography, population groups, timing, and issues. Otherwise the violence could have a disastrous effect on the potentially much more powerful and successful use of political defiance.

The historical record indicates that while casualties in dead and wounded must be expected in political defiance, they will be far fewer than the casualties in military warfare. Furthermore, this type of struggle does not contribute to the endless cycle of killing and brutality.

Nonviolent struggle both requires and tends to produce a loss (or greater control) of fear of the government and its violent repression. That abandonment or control of fear is a key element in destroying the power of the dictators over the general population.

### **Openness, secrecy, and high standards**

Secrecy, deception, and underground conspiracy pose very difficult problems for a movement using nonviolent action. It is often impossible to keep the political police and intelligence agents from learning about intentions and plans. From the perspective of the movement, secrecy is not only rooted in fear but contributes to fear, which dampens the spirit of resistance and reduces the number of people who can participate in a given action. It also can contribute to suspicions and accusations, often unjustified, within the movement, concerning who is an informer or agent for the opponents. Secrecy may also affect the ability of a movement to remain nonviolent. In contrast, openness regarding intentions and plans will not only have the opposite effects, but will contribute to an image that the resistance movement is in fact extremely powerful. The problem is of course more complex than this suggests, and there are significant aspects of resistance activities that may require secrecy. A wellinformed assessment will be required by those knowledgeable about both the dynamics of nonviolent struggle and also the dictatorship's means of surveillance in the specific situation.

The editing, printing, and distribution of underground publications, the use of illegal radio broadcasts from within the country, and the gathering of intelligence about the operations of the dictatorship are among the special limited types of activities where a high degree of secrecy will be required.

The maintenance of high standards of behavior in nonviolent action is necessary at all stages of the conflict. Such factors as fearlessness and maintaining nonviolent discipline are always required. It is important to remember that large numbers of people may frequently be

necessary to effect particular changes. However, such numbers can be obtained as reliable participants only by maintaining the high standards of the movement.

### **Shifting power relationships**

Strategists need to remember that the conflict in which political defiance is applied is a constantly changing field of struggle with continuing interplay of moves and countermoves. Nothing is static. Power relationships, both absolute and relative, are subject to constant and rapid changes. This is made possible by the resisters continuing their nonviolent persistence despite repression.

The variations in the respective power of the contending sides in this type of conflict situation are likely to be more extreme than in violent conflicts, to take place more quickly, and to have more diverse and politically significant consequences. Due to these variations, specific actions by the resisters are likely to have consequences far beyond the particular time and place in which they occur. These effects will rebound to strengthen or weaken one group or another.

In addition, the nonviolent group may, by its actions exert influence over the increase or decrease in the relative strength of *the opponent group* to a great extent. For example, disciplined courageous nonviolent resistance in face of the dictators' brutalities may induce unease, disaffection, unreliability, and in extreme situations even mutiny among the dictators' own soldiers and population. This resistance may also result in increased international condemnation of the dictatorship. In addition, skillful, disciplined, and persistent use of political defiance may result in more and more participation in the resistance by people who normally would give their tacit support to the dictators or generally remain neutral in the conflict.

### **Four mechanisms of change**

Nonviolent struggle produces change in four ways. The first mechanism is the least likely, though it has occurred. When members of the opponent group are emotionally moved by the suffering of repression imposed on courageous nonviolent resisters or are rationally persuaded that the resisters' cause is just, they may come to accept the resisters' aims. This mechanism is called conversion.

Though cases of *conversion* in nonviolent action do sometimes happen, they are rare, and in most conflicts this does not occur at all or at least not on a significant scale.

Far more often, nonviolent struggle operates by changing the conflict situation and the society so that the opponents simply cannot do as they like. It is this change that produces the other three mechanisms: accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Which of these occurs depends on the degree to which the relative and absolute power relations are shifted in favor of the democrats.

If the issues are not fundamental ones, the demands of the opposition in a limited campaign are not considered threatening, and the contest of forces has altered the power relationships to some degree, the immediate conflict may be ended by reaching an agreement, a splitting of differences or compromise. This mechanism is called *accommodation*. Many strikes are settled in this manner, for example, with both sides attaining some of their objectives but neither achieving all it wanted. A government may perceive such a settlement to have some positive benefits, such as defusing tension, creating an impression of “fairness,” or polishing the international image of the regime. It is important, therefore, that great care be exercised in selecting the issues on which a settlement by accommodation is acceptable. A struggle to bring down a dictatorship is not one of these.

Nonviolent struggle can be much more powerful than indicated by the mechanisms of conversion or accommodation. Mass noncooperation and defiance can so change social and political situations, especially power relationships, that the dictators’ ability to control the economic, social, and political processes of government and the society is in fact taken away. The opponents’ military forces may become so unreliable that they no longer simply obey orders to repress resisters. Although the opponents’ leaders remain in their positions, and adhere to their original goals, their ability to act effectively has been taken away from them. That is called *nonviolent coercion*.

In some extreme situations, the conditions producing nonviolent coercion are carried still further. The opponents’ leadership in fact loses all ability to act and their own structure of power collapses. The resisters’ self-direction, noncooperation, and defiance become so complete that the opponents now lack even a semblance of control over them. The opponents’ bureaucracy refuses to obey its own leadership. The opponents’ troops and police mutiny. The opponents’ usual supporters or population repudiate their former leadership, denying that they have any right to rule at all. Hence, their former assistance and obedience falls away. The fourth mechanism of change, *disintegration* of the opponents’ system, is so complete that they do not even have sufficient power to surrender. The regime simply falls to pieces.

In planning liberation strategies, these four mechanisms should be kept in mind. They sometimes operate essentially by chance. However, the selection of one or more of these as the intended mechanism of change in a conflict will make it possible to formulate specific and mutually reinforcing strategies. Which mechanism (or mechanisms) to select will depend on numerous factors, including the absolute and relative power of the contending groups and the attitudes and objectives of the nonviolent struggle group.

### **Democratizing effects of political defiance**

In contrast to the centralizing effects of violent sanctions, use of the technique of nonviolent struggle contributes to democratizing the political society in several ways.

One part of the democratizing effect is negative. That is, in contrast to military means, this technique does not provide a means of repression under command of a ruling elite which can be turned against the population to establish or maintain a dictatorship. Leaders of a political defiance movement can exert influence and apply pressures on their followers, but they cannot imprison or execute them when they dissent or choose other leaders.

Another part of the democratizing effect is positive. That is, nonviolent struggle provides the population with means of resistance that can be used to achieve and defend their liberties against existing or would-be dictators. Below are several of the positive democratizing effects nonviolent struggle may have:

- Experience in applying nonviolent struggle may result in the population being more self-confident in challenging the regime's threats and capacity for violent repression.
- Nonviolent struggle provides the means of noncooperation and defiance by which the population can resist undemocratic controls over them by any dictatorial group.
- Nonviolent struggle can be used to assert the practice of democratic freedoms, such as free speech, free press, independent organizations, and free assembly, in face of repressive controls.
- Nonviolent struggle contributes strongly to the survival, rebirth, and strengthening of the independent groups and institutions of the society, as previously discussed. These are important for democracy because of their capacity to mobilize the power capacity of the population and to impose limits on the effective power of any would-be dictators.
- Nonviolent struggle provides means by which the population can wield power against repressive police and military action by a dictatorial government.
- Nonviolent struggle provides methods by which the population and the independent institutions can in the interests of democracy restrict or sever the sources of power for the ruling elite, thereby threatening its capacity to continue its domination.

### **Complexity of nonviolent struggle**

As we have seen from this discussion, nonviolent struggle is a complex technique of social action, involving a multitude of methods, a range of mechanisms of change, and specific behavioral requirements. To be effective, especially against a dictatorship, political defiance requires careful planning and preparation. Prospective participants will need to understand what is required of them. Resources will need to have been made available. And strategists will need to have analyzed how nonviolent struggle can be most effectively applied. We now turn our attention to this latter crucial element: the need for strategic planning.

# *Appendix One--The Methods of Nonviolent Action*

## The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion

### **Formal statements**

1. Public speeches; 2. Letters of opposition or support; 3. Declarations by organizations and institutions; 4. Signed public statements; 5. Declarations of indictment and intention; 6. Group or mass petitions

### **Communications with a wider audience**

7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols; 8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications; 9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books; 10. Newspapers and journals; 11. Records, radio, and television; 12. Skywriting and earthwriting

### **Group representations**

13. Deputations; 14. Mock awards; 15. Group lobbying; 16. Picketing; 17. Mock elections

### **Symbolic public acts**

18. Display of flags and symbolic colors; 19. Wearing of symbols; 20. Prayer and worship; 21. Delivering symbolic objects; 22. Protest disrobings; 23. Destruction of own property; 24. Symbolic lights; 25. Displays of portraits; 26. Paint as protest; 27. New signs and names; 28. Symbolic sounds; 29. Symbolic reclamations; 30. Rude gestures

### **Pressures on individuals**

31. "Haunting" officials; 32. Taunting officials; 33. Fraternalization; 34. Vigils

### **Drama and music**

35. Humorous skits and pranks; 36. Performance of plays and music; 37. Singing

### **Processions**

38. Marches; 39. Parades; 40. Religious processions; 41. Pilgrimages; 42. Motorcades

### **Honoring the dead**

43. Political mourning; 44. Mock funerals; 45. Demonstrative funerals; 46. Homage at burial places

### **Public assemblies**

47. Assemblies of protest or support; 48. Protest meetings; 49. Camouflaged meetings of protest; 50. Teach-ins

### **Withdrawal and renunciation**

51. Walk-outs; 52. Silence; 53. Renouncing honors; 54. Turning one's back

## **THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION**

### **Ostracism of persons**

55. Social boycott; 56. Selective social boycott; 57. Lysistratic nonaction; 58. Excommunication; 59. Interdict

### **Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions**

60. Suspension of social and sports activities; 61. Boycott of social affairs; 62. Student strike; 63. Social disobedience; 64. Withdrawal from social institutions

### **Withdrawal from the social system**

65. Stay-at-home; 66. Total personal noncooperation; 67. Flight of workers; 68. Sanctuary; 69. Collective disappearance; 70. Protest emigration (*hijrat*)

## **THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION : (1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS**

### **Action by consumers**

71. Consumers' boycott; 72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods; 73. Policy of austerity; 74. Rent withholding; 75. Refusal to rent; 76. National consumers' boycott; 77. International consumers' boycott

### **Action by workers and producers**

78. Workmen's boycott; 79. Producers' boycott

### **Action by middlemen**

80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

### **Action by owners and management**

81. Traders' boycott; 82. Refusal to let or sell property; 83. Lockout; 84. Refusal of industrial assistance; 85. Merchants' "general strike"

### **Action by holders of financial resources**

86. Withdrawal of bank deposits; 87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments; 88. Refusal to pay debts or interest; 89. Severance of funds and credit; 90. Revenue refusal; 91. Refusal of a government's money

### **Action by governments**

92. Domestic embargo; 93. Blacklisting of traders; 94. International sellers' embargo; 95. International buyers' embargo; 96. International trade embargo

## THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION : (2) THE STRIKE

### **Symbolic strikes**

97. Protest strike; 98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

### **Agricultural strikes**

99. Peasant strike; 100. Farm workers' strike

### **Strikes by special groups**

101. Refusal of impressed labor; 102. Prisoners' strike; 103. Craft strike; 104. Professional strike

### **Ordinary industrial strikes**

105. Establishment strike; 106. Industry strike; 107. Sympathetic strike

### **Restricted strikes**

108. Detailed strike; 109. Bumper strike; 110. Slowdown strike; 111. Working-to-rule strike; 112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in); 113. Strike by resignation; 114. Limited strike; 115. Selective strike

### **Multi-industry strikes**

116. Generalized strike; 117. General strike

### **Combinations of strikes and economic closures**

118. *Hartal*; 119. *Economic shutdown*

## THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION

### **Rejection of authority**

120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance; 121. Refusal of public support; 122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

### **Citizens' noncooperation with government**

123. Boycott of legislative bodies; 124. Boycott of elections; 125. Boycott of government employment and positions; 126. Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies; 127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions; 128. Boycott of government-supported organizations; 129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents; 130. Removal of own signs and placemarks; 131. Refusal to accept appointed officials; 132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

### **Citizens' alternatives to obedience**

133. Reluctant and slow compliance; 134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision; 135. Popular nonobedience; 136. Disguised disobedience; 137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse; 138. Sitdown; 139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation; 140. Hiding, escape and false identities; 141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws

### **Action by government personnel**

142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides; 143. Blocking of lines of command and information; 144. Stalling and obstruction; 145. General administrative noncooperation; 146. Judicial noncooperation; 147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents; 148. Mutiny

### **Domestic governmental action**

149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays; 150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

### **International governmental action**

151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation; 152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events; 153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition; 154. Severance of diplomatic relations; 155. Withdrawal from international organizations; 156. Refusal of membership in international bodies; 157. Expulsion from international organizations

## THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION

### **Psychological intervention**

158. Self-exposure to the elements; 159. The fast (a) Fast of moral pressure (b) Hunger strike (c) Satyagrahic fast; 160. Reverse trial; 161. Nonviolent harassment

### **Physical intervention**

162. Sit-in; 163. Stand-in; 164. Ride-in; 165. Wade-in; 166. Mill-in; 167. Pray-in; 168. Nonviolent raids; 169. Nonviolent air raids; 170. Nonviolent invasion; 171. Nonviolent interjection; 172. Nonviolent obstruction; 173. Nonviolent occupation

### **Social intervention**

174. Establishing new social patterns; 175. Overloading of facilities; 176. Stall-in; 177. Speak-in; 178. Guerrilla theater; 179. Alternative social institutions; 180. Alternative communication system

### **Economic intervention**

181. Reverse strike; 182. Stay-in strike; 183. Nonviolent land seizure; 184. Defiance of blockades; 185. Politically motivated counterfeiting; 186. Preclusive purchasing; 187. Seizure of assets; 188. Dumping; 189. Selective patronage; 190. Alternative markets; 191. Alternative transportation systems; 192. Alternative economic institutions

### **Political intervention**

193. Overloading of administrative systems; 194. Disclosing identities of secret agents; 195. Seeking imprisonment; 196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws; 197. Work-on without collaboration; 198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government

\*\* This list, with definitions and historical examples, is taken from Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action*.

## *Appendix Two--Acknowledgements and Notes on the History of From Dictatorships to Democracy*

I have incurred several debts of gratitude while writing the original edition of this essay. Bruce Jenkins, my Special Assistant in 1993, made an inestimable contribution by his identification of problems in content and presentation. He also made incisive recommendations for more rigorous and clearer presentations of difficult ideas (especially concerning strategy), structural reorganization, and editorial improvements.

I am also grateful for the editorial assistance of Stephen Coady. Dr. Christopher Kruegler and Robert Helvey offered very important criticisms and advice. Dr. Hazel McFerson and Dr. Patricia Parkman provided information on struggles in Africa and Latin America, respectively. However, the analysis and conclusions contained therein are solely my responsibility.

In recent years special guidelines for translations have been developed, primarily due to Jamila Raqib’s guidance and to the lessons learned from earlier years. This has been necessary in

order to ensure accuracy in languages in which there has earlier been no established clear terminology for this field.

“From Dictatorship to Democracy” was written at the request of the late U Tin Maung Win, a prominent exile Burmese democrat who was then editor of *Khit Pyaing* (The New Era Journal).

The preparation of this text was based over forty years of research and writing on nonviolent struggle, dictatorships, totalitarian systems, resistance movements, political theory, sociological analysis, and other fields.

I could not write an analysis that had a focus only on Burma, as I did not know Burma well. Therefore, I had to write a generic analysis.

The essay was originally published in installments in *Khit Pyaing* in Burmese and English in Bangkok, Thailand in 1993. Afterwards it was issued as a booklet in both languages (1994) and in Burmese again (1996 and 1997). The original booklet editions from Bangkok were issued with the assistance of the Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma.

It was circulated both surreptitiously inside Burma and among exiles and sympathizers elsewhere. This analysis was intended only for use by Burmese democrats and various ethnic groups in Burma that wanted independence from the Burman-dominated central government in Rangoon. (Burmans are the dominant ethnic group in Burma.)

I did not then envisage that the generic focus would make the analysis potentially relevant in any country with an authoritarian or dictatorial government. However, that appears to have been the perception by people who in recent years have sought to translate and distribute it in their languages for their countries. Several persons have reported that it reads as though it was written for their country.

The SLORC military dictatorship in Rangoon wasted no time in denouncing this publication. Heavy attacks were made in 1995 and 1996, and reportedly continued in later years in newspapers, radio, and television. As late as 2005, persons were sentenced to seven-year prison terms merely for being in possession of the banned publication.

Although no efforts were made to promote the publication for use in other countries, translations and distribution of the publication began to spread on their own. A copy of the English language edition was seen on display in the window of a bookstore in Bangkok by a student from Indonesia, was purchased, and taken back home. There, it was translated into Indonesian, and published in 1997 by a major Indonesian publisher with an introduction by Abdurrahman Wahid. He was then head of Nadhlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in the world with thirty-five million members, and later President of Indonesia.

During this time, at my office at the Albert Einstein Institution we only had a handful of photocopies from the Bangkok English language booklet. For a few years we had to make copies of it when we had enquiries for which it was relevant. Later, Marek Zelaskiewz, from California, took one of those copies to Belgrade during Milosovic's time and gave it to the organization Civic Initiatives. They translated it into Serbian and published it. When we visited Serbia after the collapse of the Milosevic regime we were told that the booklet had been quite influential in the opposition movement.

Also important had been the workshop on nonviolent struggle that Robert Helvey, a retired US Army colonel, had given in Budapest, Hungary, for about twenty Serbian young people on the nature and potential of nonviolent struggle. Helvey also gave them copies of the complete *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. These were the people who became the Otpor organization that led the nonviolent struggle that brought down Milosevic.

We usually do not know how awareness of this publication has spread from country to country. Its availability on our web site in recent years has been important, but clearly that is not the only factor. Tracing these connections would be a major research project. "From Dictatorship to Democracy" is a heavy analysis and is not easy reading. Yet it has been deemed to be important enough for at least twenty-eight translations (as of January 2008) to be prepared, although they required major work and expense.

Translations of this publication in print or on a web site include the following languages: Amharic (Ethiopia), Arabic, Azeri (Azerbaijan), Bahasa Indonesia, Belarusian, Burmese, Chin (Burma), Chinese (simplified and traditional Mandarin), Dhivehi (Maldives), Farsi (Iran), French, Georgian, German, Jing Paw (Burma), Karen (Burma), Khmer (Cambodia), Kurdish, Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstan), Nepali, Pashto (Afghanistan and Pakistan), Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Tibetan, Tigrinya (Eritrea), Ukrainian, Uzbek (Uzbekistan), and Vietnamese. Several others are in preparation.

Between 1993 and 2002 there were six translations. Between 2003 and 2008 there have been twenty-two.

The great diversity of the societies and languages into which translations have spread support the provisional conclusion that the persons who initially encounter this document have seen its analysis to be relevant to their society.

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